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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 For sixty years, the federal common law D’Oench doctrine1 has 
protected the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from the 
costs and uncertainties of having to honor nonwritten agreements 
made by banks prior to their failure.2 In its original form, the doc-
trine prevented banks and borrowers from making secret side agree-
ments to their loans for the purpose of deceiving bank examiners like 
the FDIC3 and provided the FDIC with an important tool with which 
                                                                                                                    
 * Associate, Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., Miami, Florida. J.D. with Honors, 
Florida State University College of Law, 2002. B.S.J., Northwestern University, 1997. Very 
special thanks to my heroes, Larry Kellogg and Valerie Loth. This Comment was written 
as part of the Ausley Scholars program through the generous support of DuBose Ausley. 
 1. From D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942). 
 2. See Murphy v. FDIC, 208 F.3d 959, 967 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that the D’Oench 
doctrine’s rationale is “to protect the FDIC from enforcement of oral agreements against 
failed financial institutions”). 
 3. D’Oench, 315 U.S. at 457; see also Fred Galves, Might Does Not Make Right: The 
Call for Reform of the Federal Government’s D’Oench, Duhme and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) Su-
perpowers in Failed Bank Litigation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1323, 1327-28 (1996) (describing 
the common law D’Oench doctrine’s original scope). 
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to protect the integrity of the country’s banking system.4 In 1950, 
Congress included a provision in its Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
(FDIA) that was analogous to, but did not abrogate, the common law 
D’Oench doctrine.5 Together, the common law doctrine and its statu-
tory counterpart, found at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), allowed the FDIC to 
rely on the records of insolvent banks and  to evaluate those banks’ 
assets and liabilities with greater accuracy.6 Working in tandem,7 
they helped the FDIC boost the public’s confidence in the banking in-
dustry.8 
 The banking crisis that began in the 1980s, however, threw the 
industry into turmoil and threatened to bankrupt the FDIC.9 In re-
sponse, Congress and the courts expanded the scope of the statutory 
and common law versions of the D’Oench doctrine and provided the 
FDIC greater protection against defenses and affirmative claims 
made by borrowers or creditors of insolvent banks.10 The protective 
scope of the common law version of the D’Oench doctrine, in particu-
lar, extended beyond § 1823(e):11 in effect, the common law D’Oench 
doctrine now bars the borrowers or creditors of failed banks from as-
serting any defense or affirmative claim without a written agree-
ment, even in cases where the failed bank committed fraud or mis-
representation.12 
 Although the D’Oench doctrine’s expansion prevented the drain-
age of millions of dollars from the FDIC’s taxpayer-funded insurance 
                                                                                                                    
 4. Michael Keeley & Toni Scott Reed, “Superpowers” of Federal Regulators: How the 
Banking Crisis Created an Entire Genre of Bond Litigation, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 817, 853-
54 (1996). 
 5. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 81-797, ch. 967, § 2(13)(e)(1), 64 Stat. 
889 (1950) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (2000)); see also John B. Shumad-
ine, Comment, Striking a Balance: Statutory Displacement of Established Federal Common 
Law and the D’Oench Doctrine in Murphy v. FDIC and Motorcity of Jacksonville Ltd. v. 
Southeast Bank, 51 ME. L. REV. 129, 144 (1999) (recognizing that the FDIA did not dis-
place the common law D’Oench doctrine). 
 6. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1987). 
 7. Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317, 1326 n.7 (11th 
Cir. 1996) (en banc) (noting that courts employed §1823(e) and the common law D’Oench 
doctrine in tandem). 
 8. The FDIC has helped create a stable, trustworthy banking system in the United 
States; now, “a run on a bank has become an image from history.” Marsha Hymanson, 
Note, Borrower Beware: D’Oench, Duhme and Section 1823 Overprotect the Insurer When 
Banks Fail, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 253, 258 (1988). 
 9. Galves, supra note 3, at 1325-26, 1334 (stating that the decade from the mid-
1980s to mid-1990s saw 1,315 national bank failures, costing the government from $150 
billion to $1 trillion, and that the FDIC exhausted its entire insurance fund by 1991). 
 10. Barry S. Zisman & Hugh D. Spears, Overview of Special Powers of the FDIC and 
RTC, in BANKS AND THRIFTS: INTRODUCTION TO FDIC/RTC RECEIVERSHIP LAW 73, 75-76 
(Warren L. Dennis & Barry S. Zisman eds., 1992). 
 11. See David F. D’Alessandris, Murphy v. FDIC: Is the D’Oench Doctrine Doomed?, 
50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 3, 16 (1996) (suggesting that the common law D’Oench doc-
trine blocks claims that § 1823(e) does not). 
 12. Zisman & Spears, supra note 10, at 76-77. 
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system, it has been criticized for creating some undeniably unfair re-
sults.13 Starting in 1995, perhaps in response to increasing cries of 
unfairness, a number of circuit courts of appeals have ruled that 
Congress preempted the common law D’Oench doctrine when it en-
acted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement 
Act of 1989 (FIRREA).14 As a result, the FDIC’s ability to bar secret 
side agreements has been significantly contracted in those circuits 
because it must now rely on § 1823(e)’s narrower protections. 
 Recently, in Murphy v. FDIC,15 the FDIC successfully defended 
the common law D’Oench doctrine’s existence in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, slowing the abrogation movement’s momentum. Recognizing a 
classic circuit split,16 the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari.17 However, only days before oral arguments, the parties set-
tled.18 
 The common law D’Oench doctrine’s fate remains undetermined, 
and jurisdiction remains the key to success in the cases in which it is 
invoked.19 Part II of this Comment introduces the common law and 
statutory versions of the D’Oench doctrine, and Part III describes the 
nature and extent of their expansion. Part IV describes Murphy, 
which exemplifies the current circuit split because it was tried first 
in the D.C. Circuit and then in the Eleventh Circuit, with contrary 
outcomes. Part V argues that the Supreme Court will not resolve the 
issue soon, if ever. For the doctrine to survive until that day, the 
FDIC must retain D’Oench’s presence within as many circuits as pos-
sible. Part V also argues that, for policy reasons, the courts of appeals 
should recognize the common law D’Oench doctrine. 
                                                                                                                    
 13. E.g., Richard E. Flint, Why D’Oench, Duhme? An Economic, Legal, and Philoso-
phical Critique of a Failed Bank Policy, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 465 (1992) (arguing that 
D’Oench is unfair to debtors); Galves, supra note 3, at 1333 (arguing that the common law 
D’Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) create inequities and should be scaled back). 
 14. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. 
L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183. The circuit courts of appeals that have held that FIRREA ab-
rogated the common law D’Oench doctrine include the D.C., Third, Eighth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits. See infra notes 117-20. 
 15. 208 F.3d 959 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 16. The common law D’Oench doctrine still exists in the Eleventh and Fourth Cir-
cuits. See id.; Young v. FDIC, 103 F.3d 1180 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 17. Murphy v. Beck, 121 S. Ct. 30 (2000). 
 18. Murphy v. Beck, 121 S. Ct. 849 (2001). The case was dismissed pursuant to Su-
preme Court Rule 46.1, which applies to settlements. 
 19. Because of the circuit split, forum shopping may be frequent. Reply Brief for Peti-
tioner at 3, Murphy v. Beck, 121 S. Ct. 30 (2000), cert. dismissed, 121 S. Ct. 849 (2001) (No. 
00-46). The FDIC can be sued in the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 3 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A) 
(2000)). However, Atlanta and Charlotte, the two largest banking centers in the southern 
United States, are located in the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, which continue to recog-
nize the common law D’Oench doctrine. Id. at 3 n.3. 
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II.   THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW D’OENCH DOCTRINE AND ITS 
STATUTORY COUNTERPART, § 1823(e) 
A.   The FDIC 
 As the United States languished in the Great Depression and 
confidence in its banking industry lulled, Congress enacted the 
Banking Act of 193320 to restore confidence in the country’s banking 
industry.21 The Act created the FDIC, which regulates and insures 
deposits in all federally chartered banks and in many state chartered 
banks.22 
 The FDIC acts in two capacities. In its “corporate” capacity, the 
FDIC acts as a deposit insurer.23 It can either pay the depositors of a 
failed bank directly or transfer depositors’ money to other insured 
banks.24 In its “receiver” capacity, the FDIC has broad authority to 
merge part or all of the failed bank with a healthy bank, assume op-
erations of the bank, or both.25 Purchase and assumption transac-
tions are the FDIC’s most commonly used tool for handling failed 
banks.26 In a typical purchase and assumption transaction, the FDIC, 
in its receivership capacity, sells all of the failed bank’s acceptable 
assets to a healthy bank, then sells the remaining unacceptable or 
problematic assets to the FDIC in its corporate capacity.27 The 
FDIC’s corporate side then tries to collect on those problematic assets 
to protect the insurance fund’s coffers.28 
B.   D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC29 
 Amidst the post-Depression atmosphere, the FDIC insured an Il-
linois bank, Belleville Bank & Trust Co.30 D’Oench, a securities 
dealer based in St. Louis, sold Belleville bonds that later defaulted.31 
To relieve Belleville from having past-due bonds on its books, 
D’Oench agreed to borrow $5,000 from Belleville.32 In its receipts for 
                                                                                                                    
 20. Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 12B(a), 48 Stat. 162, 168. 
 21. See Jeffrey R. Gleit, Note, The Reports of the Demise of the D’Oench Doctrine Have 
Been Greatly Exaggerated: The Continuing Coexistence of the D’Oench Doctrine and Section 
1823(e), 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 225, 226 (1999). 
 22. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2000) (allowing the FDIC to regulate banks); id. § 1821(a) (al-
lowing the FDIC to insure banks); JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING 
LAW AND REGULATION 61 (1992). 
 23. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 4. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).  
 30. Id. at 454. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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the demand notes, however, Belleville promised D’Oench that it 
would never call in the loan.33 These dealings effectively swept the 
worthless bonds from Belleville’s books and replaced them with a 
credible asset: the loan.34 
 In 1938, Belleville Bank failed. The FDIC acquired D’Oench’s 
$5,000 demand note as part of the collateral for a $1 million loan to 
resuscitate the bank.35 The FDIC sued D’Oench for repayment of the 
note, as well as for allegedly violating § 12B(s) of the Federal Reserve 
Act (FRA), which levied fines for knowingly making misstatements to 
the FDIC about the value of securities.36 D’Oench argued that the 
note was executed without consideration and that Belleville orally 
agreed never to bring suit for nonpayment.37 In response, the FDIC 
argued that D’Oench violated the FRA by knowingly misrepresenting 
its true purpose for borrowing from Belleville: to enhance the bank’s 
balance sheet.38 These misrepresentations, the FDIC argued, es-
topped D’Oench from asserting any defenses.39  
 The Court held that D’Oench, Duhme & Co. could not use its oral 
side agreement with Belleville Bank as a defense against the FDIC: 
The test is whether the note was designed to deceive the creditors 
or the public authority, or would tend to have that effect. It would 
be sufficient in this type of case that the maker lent himself to a 
scheme or arrangement whereby the banking authority on which 
respondent relied in insuring the bank was or was likely to be mis-
led.40 
 Essentially, the Court created a new federal common law rule41 
that prevented banks and borrowers from making secret side agree-
                                                                                                                    
 33. Id. Specifically, the note said: “This note is given with the understanding it will 
not be called for payment. All interest payments to be repaid.” Id. D’Oench kept the loan 
alive by making periodic interest payments. Id. at 454, 456. 
 34. Cherie Stephens Bock, Comment, Alive, But Not Quite Kicking: Circuit Split Illus-
trates the Progressive Deterioration of the D’Oench, Duhme Doctrine, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
945, 952 (1998). 
 35. D’Oench, 315 U.S. at 454. 
 36. Id. at 456-57. Interestingly, the main issue on appeal did not involve the loan. 
Rather, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a dispute between the District 
Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals over whether Illinois or Missouri choice of 
law rules applied. Id. at 455-56. The Court quickly sidestepped the issue, holding that 
D’Oench’s liability was a federal question thanks to the FDIC’s Federal Reserve Act claim. 
Id. at 456. This distraction aside, Justice Douglas and the Court proceeded to create a fed-
eral common law doctrine that has survived for sixty years. 
 37. Id. at 456. D’Oench also argued that FDIC was not a holder in due course. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 460. 
 41. Ironically, only four years earlier the Supreme Court had announced “There is no 
federal general common law.” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). In 
D’Oench, Justice Frankfurter was aware of the Court’s previous pronouncement and ar-
gued for resolving the dispute between D’Oench and the FDIC using state law. D’Oench, 
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ments to their loans for the purpose of deceiving bank examiners like 
the FDIC.42 The Court cited a federal public policy under the FRA to 
protect the FDIC from misrepresentations, intentional or not,43 
regarding the types or amounts of securities or other assets listed in 
the portfolios of insured banks.44 Over time, the common law D’Oench 
doctrine has come to be seen as serving two principal public policies: 
maintaining the public’s confidence in the banking system, especially 
in times of crisis; and allowing the FDIC to quickly and accurately 
determine a failed bank’s financial status and decide whether to liq-
uidate the bank or sell its assets.45 
C.   Expansion of Common Law Doctrine 
 In the sixty years since D’Oench, the common law D’Oench doc-
trine has expanded to protect “virtually all claims and defenses 
against [the FDIC’s] interests.”46 Prior to the 1980s, when the coun-
try’s banking industry experienced relative calm, courts rarely in-
voked the common law doctrine47 and usually only against fraudulent 
borrowers.48 In the few instances when courts invoked the doctrine, 
they stayed within the boundaries of the D’Oench Court’s original 
holding.49 However, the 1980s saw an increase in bank failures dur-
ing the savings and loan crisis.50 To protect the FDIC, courts began 
increasing the D’Oench doctrine’s scope.51 Today, the common law 
doctrine is much broader than the version crafted by the Supreme 
Court in 1942.52  
 For example, some courts expanded the common law doctrine’s 
scope to include open, non-secret side agreements.53 Also, in an ex-
pansion of the D’Oench doctrine that critics view as contrary to 
                                                                                                                    
315 U.S. at 463-65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). However, Justice Jackson countered and 
prevailed, saying “Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be impo-
tent.” Id. at 470 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 42. Galves, supra note 3, at 1327-28.  
 43. D’Oench, 315 U.S. at 458-59. Also, the Court held that it is irrelevant whether the 
misrepresentation deceives or specifically injures creditors like the FDIC. Id. at 459. 
 44. See id. at 457-58. 
 45. Galves, supra note 3, at 1346-47 (citing Oversight of the FDIC and the RTC’s Use 
of D’Oench Duhme: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt. & the D.C. 
of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 141, 143 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Oversight Hearings]). 
 46. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 5; see also Galves, supra note 3, at 1344-45. 
 47. Bock, supra note 34, at 958. 
 48. Galves, supra note 3, at 1348-49. 
 49. Bock, supra note 34, at 958. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.; Galves, supra note 3, at 1349. 
 52. Bock, supra note 34, at 958. 
 53. Galves, supra note 3, at 1349; see also, e.g., FDIC v. Merchant’s Nat’l Bank, 725 
F.2d 634, 640 (11th Cir. 1984) (determining that bank examiners’ discovery of an unwrit-
ten agreement is irrelevant). 
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D’Oench’s equitable origin, courts have allowed the FDIC to invoke 
D’Oench in cases in which the failed bank defrauded the borrower.54 
Courts have also been criticized for allowing the FDIC to bar claims 
by the failed banks’ creditors and contractors.55 
 In its original form, the common law D’Oench doctrine applied to 
the FDIC only in its corporate capacity.56 However, the courts have 
broadened D’Oench to protect the FDIC in its role as a receiver.57 The 
common law D’Oench doctrine has also broadened to include agree-
ments made by borrowers and subsidiaries of failed banks;58 to pro-
tect the FDIC’s third-party assignees, transferees, and successors-in-
interest;59 and to provide the FDIC with holder-in-due-course status 
relating to fraud claims that stemmed from the FDIC’s purchase and 
assumption transactions.60 Furthermore, courts extended the 
D’Oench doctrine to protect the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation (FSLIC), in both its corporate and receivership roles.61 
Each time the courts expanded the common law D’Oench doctrine’s 
scope, they invoked the D’Oench Court’s original policy rationale.62 
D.   D’Oench’s Statutory Analogue: 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) 
1.   Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 
 Within the FDIA, Congress enacted a statutory provision paral-
                                                                                                                    
 54. Galves, supra note 3, at 1350 (citing FDIC v. Hatmaker, 756 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 
1985), in which the borrower signed a blank note, but the bank inserted an amount five 
times greater than the amount the borrower orally agreed to). 
 55. Id. These cases often involve fact patterns in which the FDIC declines to pay sub-
contractors, like roofers and janitors, who complete work on an asset of the failed bank. Id. 
Perhaps recognizing these cases as public relations disasters, e.g., Peter A. Brown, Workers 
Holding Bills Owed by Failed Banks Left Holding the Bag, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS 
SERVICE, Weekend Release, May 7-8, 1994, the FDIC issued a policy statement instructing 
its lawyers not to use D’Oench against vendors when clear evidence exists that the vendors 
supplied the goods or services promised. FDIC Statement of Policy Regarding Federal 
Common Law and Statutory Provisions Protecting FDIC, as Receiver or Corporate Liqui-
dator, Against Unrecorded Agreements or Arrangements of a Depository Institution Prior 
to Receivership, 62 Fed. Reg. 5984, 5986 (Feb. 10, 1997).  
 56. D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 460 (1942). 
 57. E.g., FDIC v. First Nat’l Fin. Co., 587 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 58. Oliver v. Resolution Trust Corp., 955 F.2d 583, 585 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 59. Newton v. Uniwest Fin. Corp., 967 F.2d 340, 347 (9th Cir. 1992) (protecting suc-
cessors-in-interest of the FDIC); Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523, 1528 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(protecting the FDIC’s bridge bank assignees); see also Barbara A. Bailey, Comment, Giv-
ing D’Oench its Due: A Comment on the D’Oench, Duhme Doctrine After O’Melveny & 
Myers v. FDIC, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1259, 1264-65 (1996) (describing judicial expansion of the 
common law D’Oench doctrine). 
 60. Galves, supra note 3, at 1351-52. 
 61. FSLIC v. Kearney Trust Co., 151 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1945); see also D’Alessandris, 
supra note 11, at 6 (discussing the expansion of the D’Oench doctrine to the FSLIC). 
 62. Gleit, supra note 21, at 232. 
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leling the D’Oench doctrine.63 Section 13(e),64 codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
1823(e),65 disavowed any agreement by a bank and its borrowers that 
affected assets acquired by the FDIC, unless that agreement was in 
writing;66 contemporaneous;67 approved by the bank’s management;68 
and officially recorded by the bank.69 Like the common law D’Oench 
doctrine, § 1823(e) allowed the FDIC, in its corporate capacity, to rely 
on a failed bank’s records without concern for possible secret side 
agreements with borrowers or clients.70 In 1987, the Supreme Court 
found that the purposes behind § 1823(e) reflected those espoused in 
the original D’Oench case.71 
 Importantly, however, the Act’s legislative history does not ex-
pressly address whether Congress meant to codify and abrogate the 
common law D’Oench doctrine or simply supplement it.72 Nothing in 
the FDIA’s legislative history implies that Congress intended to ab-
rogate D’Oench.73 In fact, Congress never even mentioned the 
D’Oench doctrine.74 Furthermore, the FDIC never indicated to Con-
                                                                                                                    
 63. Bock, supra note 34, at 954 (stating that § 1823(e) echoed the common law 
D’Oench doctrine); Gleit, supra note 21, at 231 (characterizing § 1823(e) as an “adjunct” to 
the common law doctrine). 
 64. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 81-797, ch. 967, § 2(13)(e), 64 Stat. 889 
(1950) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (2000)). 
 65. As enacted in 1950, § 1823(e) read: 
 No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title or interest of 
the Corporation in any asset acquired by it under this section, either as security 
for a loan or by purchase, shall be valid against the Corporation unless such 
agreement (1) shall be in writing, (2) shall have been executed by the bank and 
the person or persons claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including the ob-
ligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the bank, (3) shall 
have been approved by the board of directors of the bank or its loan committee, 
which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or committee, and 
(4) shall have been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record 
of the bank. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, ch. 967, 64 Stat. 873 (1950) (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. § 1823(e) (2000)). 
 66. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1)(A). 
 67. Id. § 1823(e)(1)(B). 
 68. Id. § 1823(e)(1)(C). 
 69. Id. § 1823(e)(1)(D). 
 70. Bock, supra note 34, at 954-55. 
 71. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 (1987). The Court found that § 1823(e) allowed the 
FDIC to rely on failed banks’ records and scrutinize unusual transactions. Id. at 91-93. 
 72. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 8. 
 73. Galves, supra note 3, at 1354. 
 74. Hymanson, supra note 8, at 277. The language that would become § 1823(e) was 
contemplated just once in testimony before the House, and then only briefly. Amendments 
to Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 1950: Hearings on S. 2822 Before the House Comm. on 
Banking and Currency, 81st Cong. 41-42 (1950) (statement of John F. Bovenzi, Director of 
FDIC’s Division of Depositor & Asset Services). 
 Furthermore, when 13(e) was added to the FDIA, only one amendment was proposed, 
changing the language in 13(e) to make it clear that the statute and the common law 
D’Oench doctrine would not give the FDIC greater rights than banks. 96 CONG. REC. 
10731-32 (1950). Congress ignored the amendment. Id. at 10770. 
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gress that it thought § 1823(e) was needed to cure any perceived 
faultiness or ineffectiveness within the D’Oench doctrine.75 But once 
Congress enacted § 1823(e), the FDIC used it in tandem with the 
common law doctrine in litigation.76 Section 1823(e) arguably “was an 
afterthought to a complex bill and one which received virtually no 
public debate or congressional analysis.”77 As such, it should be con-
strued narrowly.78  
2.   Congress Expands § 1823(e): FIRREA 
 In the 1980s, the United States became embroiled in another 
banking crisis as record numbers of banks became insolvent.79 To 
help the FDIC cope with these failed banks and restore public confi-
dence in the savings and loan industry, Congress enacted a number 
of laws,80 including the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act 
of 1982,81 and then the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),82 which abolished the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and put the de-
posit insurance functions of savings and loans and savings banks in 
the FDIC’s hands.83 FIRREA expanded the scope of § 1823(e) and in-
creased the FDIC’s protection against claims arising from oral, non-
contemporaneous, unapproved, and unofficial agreements between 
failed banks and borrowers.84 
 Before 1989, the common law D’Oench doctrine was significantly 
broader and more protective of the FDIC than its statutory counter-
part, § 1823(e). Congress’s enactment of FIRREA narrowed this gap. 
The statute reads: 
 No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of 
the Corporation in any asset acquired by it under this section or 
section 1821 of this title, either as security for a loan or by pur-
chase or as receiver of any insured depository institution, shall be 
valid against the Corporation unless such agreement— 
 (A) is in writing, 
                                                                                                                    
 75. Hymanson, supra note 8, at 276. 
 76. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 8. 
 77. Hymanson, supra note 8, at 279. 
 78. Id. at 279-80. 
 79. Id. at 258-59. 
 80. See DiVall Insured Income Fund P’ship v. Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank, 69 F.3d 
1398, 1401 n.6 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that Congress enacted FIRREA in response to the 
country’s banking and savings and loan crises). 
 81. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469. The legislative history of the Garn-St. Germain 
Act shows Congress’s intent to make it easier for the FDIC to arrange bailouts as well as 
purchase and assumption agreements. Hymanson, supra note 8, at 281.  
 82. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217(4), 103 Stat. 183, 256 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1823 (2000)). 
 83. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 4. 
 84. Gleit, supra note 21, at 233. 
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 (B) was executed by the depository institution and any person 
claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, 
contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the deposi-
tory institution, 
 (C) was approved by the board of directors of the depository in-
stitution or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in 
the minutes of said board or committee, and 
 (D) has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an of-
ficial record of the depository institution.85 
 Among its new protections, FIRREA applied § 1823(e) to the 
FDIC in its role as receiver.86 Also, the Act protected bridge banks 
and new banks created by the FDIC to deal with institutions in de-
fault.87 Perhaps most importantly, FIRREA created § 1821(d)(9)(A), 
which protected the FDIC from affirmative claims—including mis-
representation—arising out of any agreement not in compliance with 
§ 1823(e).88 Furthermore, FIRREA applied § 1823(e) to defenses 
raised against the FSLIC’s successor, the Resolution Trust Company 
(RTC), in both its corporate and receivership capacities.89 Much like 
the legislative history of § 1823(e)’s first incarnation in 1950, 
FIRREA’s legislative history included “no significant debate” about 
the changes made to § 1823(e).90 
III.   COMPARISON OF SCOPE 
A.   The Common Law D’Oench Doctrine Provides Broader Protection 
Than § 1823(e) 
 The common law D’Oench doctrine and its statutory analogue,  § 
1823(e), each provide the FDIC with protection from unwritten 
agreements made by the failed banks it deals with. However, the 
common law D’Oench doctrine has always provided broader protec-
tion than § 1823(e).91 When Congress passed the FDIA in 1950, the 
Act protected only the FDIC.92 In contrast, by 1945 the Supreme 
Court had already expanded the common law D’Oench doctrine to 
protect the FSLIC.93 As time passed, the common law doctrine grew 
                                                                                                                    
 85. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) (2000). 
 86. Act of Aug. 19, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 201, 217, 103 Stat. 187, 256. 
 87. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(4)(I). 
 88. Id. § 1821(d)(9)(A). Essentially, § 1821(d)(9)(A) codified case law which allowed the 
FDIC to use the common law D’Oench doctrine to bar affirmative claims. E.g., Langley v. 
FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 (1987). 
 89. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4)(A). FIRREA abolished the FSLIC and replaced it with the 
RTC. Gleit, supra note 21, at 233 n.76. 
 90. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 9. 
 91. Id. at 8. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See FSLIC v. Kearney Trust Co., 151 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1945). 
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even broader.94 Despite FIRREA’s broadening of § 1823(e) in 1989, 
the common law D’Oench doctrine still provides broader protection to 
the FDIC than does FIRREA § 1823(e),95 acting as a “safety net . . . to 
cover situations which fall through the cracks” of § 1823(e).96 For ex-
ample, § 1823(e) bars defenses based on an unwritten agreement re-
lated to specific assets acquired or assumed by the FDIC.97 Thus, § 
1823(e) does not protect liabilities acquired or assumed by the FDIC. 
In those frequent cases involving liabilities, however, courts have 
used the common law D’Oench doctrine to rescue the FDIC and bar 
borrowers’ claims.98 The common law D’Oench doctrine also provides 
the FDIC with other protections not covered by § 1823(e),99 including 
protection of third parties involved in purchase and assumption 
agreements with the FDIC;100 protection of assignees and successors-
in-interest of the FDIC;101 and protection of failed banks’ subsidiar-
ies.102  
 Generally, however, “it is very difficult to decide where the stat-
ute ends and D’Oench begins.”103 But courts, attempting to effectuate 
the legislative purpose of § 1823(e), continue to apply the common 
law D’Oench doctrine in cases not covered by § 1823(e).104 As a result, 
the common law D’Oench doctrine gradually has been expanded into 
a federal holder-in-due-course doctrine.105 Its breadth and flexibility 
“almost always allow[s] the FDIC to prevail when it is asserted.”106 
                                                                                                                    
 94. See supra Part II.C. 
 95. DiVall Insured Income Fund P’ship v. Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank, 69 F.3d 1398, 
1401 (1995) (“The common law D’Oench Duhme doctrine is roughly analogous to . . . [ § 
1823(e)] but does provide the FDIC with broader protections in certain instances.”); see 
also Bailey, supra note 59, at 1264 (noting numerous cases where the D’Oench doctrine 
provides “broader protection” than § 1823(e)); Gleit, supra note 21, at 232 (arguing that 
courts have applied D’Oench in situations not covered by § 1823). 
 96. In re NBW Commercial Paper Litig., 826 F. Supp. 1448, 1466 (D.D.C. 1992). 
 97. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) (2000). 
 98. See Brookside Assocs. v. Rifkin, 49 F.3d 490, 495 (9th Cir. 1995); Inn at Saratoga 
Assocs. v. FDIC, 60 F.3d 78, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1995); John v. RTC, 39 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 
1994); see also Young v. FDIC, 103 F.3d 1180, 1188-89 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating in dicta that 
the common law D’Oench doctrine overcomes § 1823(e)’s “specific assets” limitation); E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FDIC, 32 F.3d 592, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that the 
common law D’Oench doctrine overcomes § 1823(e)’s “specific asset” limitation). 
 99. Bailey, supra note 59, at 1265. 
 100. NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank v. Johnson, 11 F.3d 1260, 1267-68 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 101. Newton v. Uniwest Fin. Corp., 967 F.2d 340, 347 (9th Cir. 1992) (protecting suc-
cessors-in-interest of the FDIC); Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523, 1528 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(protecting the FDIC’s bridge bank assignees). 
 102. Oliver v. Resolution Trust Corp., 955 F.2d 583, 585 (8th Cir. 1992).  
 103. Warren L. Dennis, The O’Melveny Decision: End of an Era, 514 PRACTISING LAW 
INST./LITIG. 109, 126 (1994) (quoting In re NBW Commercial Paper Litig., 826 F. Supp. 
1448, 1457 (D.D.C. 1992)). 
 104. Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 
1996) (en banc). 
 105. Rankin v. Toberoff, No. 95-CIV. 10995(AGS), 1998 WL 370305, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 30, 1998); see also D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 6. 
 106. Gleit, supra note 21, at 235.  
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For this reason, the FDIC continues to fight the growing circuit court 
schism. 
B.   The FDIC’s 1997 Policy Statement 
 In 1997, the FDIC issued a policy statement directing its attor-
neys to curtail their use of the common law D’Oench doctrine in all 
cases originating after the enactment of FIRREA in 1989.107 In the 
policy statement, the FDIC included guidelines describing seven 
situations in which FDIC attorneys might need approval from FDIC 
headquarters in Washington, D.C., before asserting the D’Oench doc-
trine.108 Wanting to protect the core of the common law doctrine from 
judicial attack, the FDIC delivered a policy aimed at tempering un-
fair results in some cases:109 
 Although the D’Oench doctrine and the statutory provisions gen-
erally promote essential public policy goals, overly aggressive ap-
plication of the specific requirement of these legal doctrines could 
lead to inequitable and inconsistent results in particular cases. In 
order to ameliorate this possibility, the FDIC has undertaken de-
velopment of these guidelines and procedures to promote the exer-
cise of sound discretion in the application of D’Oench or the statu-
tory provisions.110 
 But in its practical effects, the policy statement really only scales 
back D’Oench’s use in cases of obvious unfairness. Washington has 
complete discretionary authority over cases involving close questions 
similar to Murphy.111 In fact, the FDIC has continued to invoke the 
common law D’Oench doctrine even after issuing the statement.112 
Furthermore, the FDIC’s policy statement does not affect the ability 
of bridge banks, transferees, or assignees to invoke the common law 
D’Oench doctrine. Despite its policy statement, the FDIC continues to 
                                                                                                                    
 107. FDIC Statement of Policy Regarding Federal Common Law and Statutory Provi-
sions Protecting FDIC, as Receiver or Corporate Liquidator, Against Unrecorded Agree-
ments or Arrangements of a Depository Institution Prior to Receivership, 62 Fed. Reg. 
5984, 5985 (Feb. 10, 1997) [hereinafter FDIC Policy Statement]. 
 108. These types of cases included cases involving pre-closing vendors, id. at 5986; dili-
gent parties, id.; documents indicating a borrower’s claim, id. at 5987; transactions not re-
corded within the ordinary course of business, id.; bilateral obligations, id.; statutory de-
fenses, id. at 5987-88; and cases involving § 1823(e)’s contemporaneous requirement, id. at 
5988. 
 109. The FDIC most likely issued the statement in response to the D.C. Circuit’s 1995 
decision in Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1995), in which it held that FIRREA 
preempted the common law D’Oench doctrine. 
 110. FDIC Policy Statement, supra note 107, at 5986. 
 111. Id. at 5984. 
 112. See, e.g., FDIC v. Noel, 177 F.3d 911, 917-18 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. 
Ct. 935 (2000); Young v. FDIC, 103 F.3d 1180, 1187-89 (4th Cir. 1997); FDIC v. Frates, 44 
F. Supp. 2d. 1176, 1220-21 (N.D. Okla. 1999). 
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use the common law D’Oench doctrine because its scope exceeds the 
scope of § 1823(e). 
IV.   MURPHY AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 For years, the common law D’Oench doctrine and its statutory 
counterpart, § 1823(e) of the FDIC Act, provided the FDIC with an 
almost unbeatable legal tool that acted both as a weapon and a 
shield.113 But in 1995, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia made D’Oench vulnerable in Murphy v. FDIC.114 Relying on a 
1994 Supreme Court case, O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,115 which held 
that the judiciary could not create new federal common law that al-
ters congressional legislation,116 the D.C. Circuit held that FIRREA 
preempted the common law D’Oench doctrine.117 Subsequently, the 
Eighth,118 Ninth,119 and Third120 Circuits have issued similar hold-
ings. Suddenly, the FDIC found one of its most effective litigation 
tools in jeopardy. However, after the D.C. Circuit remanded Murphy 
v. FDIC, the case was moved to the Eleventh Circuit, which upheld 
the common law D’Oench doctrine within its jurisdiction.121 
A.   Facts and Procedural History 
 In 1989, Bruce Murphy received a letter from a Florida developer, 
Orchid Island Associates Limited Partnership (Orchid), inviting Mur-
phy to invest in a golf and beach club development.122 The letter 
included a statement by Arthur Andersen & Co. that projected a “6.1 
multiple return on . . . investment.”123 Emboldened, Murphy invested 
more than $515,000 for a stake in the Orchid partnership.124 The pro-
ject’s construction lender, Southeast Bank, loaned Orchid more than 
$50 million; however, Orchid defaulted.125 A short time later, South-
east Bank failed and went into FDIC receivership.126  
 In August 1992, Murphy sued the FDIC in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia.127 Murphy alleged that 
                                                                                                                    
 113. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 5; see also Galves, supra note 3, at II.A. 
 114. 61 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 115. 512 U.S. 79 (1994). 
 116. Id. at 87. 
 117. Murphy, 61 F.3d at 35. 
 118. See DiVall Ins. Income Fund Ltd. v. Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank, 69 F.3d 1398 
(8th Cir. 1995). 
 119. See RTC v. Kennelly, 57 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 120. See FDIC v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 121. Murphy v. FDIC, 208 F.3d 959 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 122. Id. at 961. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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Southeast’s involvement in the development went beyond that of a 
construction lender and rose to the level of “joint venturer or part-
ner.”128 Seeking damages and an order forcing the FDIC to release 
pertinent accounting statements, Murphy argued that Southeast 
caused the investment to fail.129 He sued for breach of fiduciary du-
ties, breach of contract, accounting improprieties, fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, and failure to register securities.130  
 The FDIC countered with the D’Oench doctrine, arguing that 
Murphy could not point to any written document stating that South-
east was a joint venturer or partner in the development.131 The FDIC 
moved to dismiss Murphy’s claim under the common law D’Oench 
doctrine.132 The district court treated the FDIC’s motion as a motion 
for summary judgment and dismissed Murphy’s complaint for failure 
to state a claim.133 
 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Murphy 
faced the daunting task of overcoming both § 1823(e) and the com-
mon law D’Oench doctrine. However, shortly before Murphy’s appeal, 
the Supreme Court released its O’Melveny opinion. Murphy seized on 
the Court’s decision, in which it held that it would not create federal 
common law rules to supplement “comprehensive and detailed” fed-
eral statutes,134 to argue that FIRREA preempted the common law 
D’Oench doctrine.135 
B.   The Supreme Court: O’Melveny and Atherton Threaten the 
Common Law D’Oench Doctrine 
 In O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,136 the Supreme Court limited the 
FDIC’s ability to use federal common law doctrine in the litigation of 
failed banks.137 In that case, the FDIC sued a law firm that repre-
sented a savings and loan (S&L) which later fell into FDIC receiver-
ship.138 The FDIC alleged professional negligence and breach of fidu-
ciary duty under California law.139 Both claims arose out of the firm’s 
alleged failure to tell the FDIC about illegal acts committed by the 
                                                                                                                    
 128. Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 129. Id. at 36. 
 130. Id. at 35-36. Murphy also complained that the FDIC failed to establish alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) procedures. Id. at 36. The D.C. Circuit rejected this cause of ac-
tion because FIRREA’s ADR statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(7)(B)(iii) (2000), gave the FDIC 
discretion to refer cases to ADR. Murphy, 61 F.3d at 40-41. 
 131. Id. at 36. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Murphy v. FDIC, 208 F.3d 959, 961 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 134. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88-89 (1994). 
 135. Murphy, 61 F.3d at 36. 
 136. 512 U.S. 79. 
 137. Bock, supra note 34, at 966. 
 138. O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 81-82. 
 139. Id. at 82. 
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S&L’s controlling officers.140 The law firm asserted a state-law-based 
defense that imputed the officers’ actions to the FDIC through the 
S&L.141 The FDIC asked the Supreme Court to create a federal com-
mon law rule to prevent such an imputation.142 
 However, the Court held unanimously that FIRREA preempted 
the creation of federal common law regarding imputation.143 The con-
trolling law, it stated, must be found either in the federal statute or 
in state law.144 The Court held that, absent a significant conflict be-
tween a government interest or policy and the use of state law,145 it 
would not create federal common law rules to supplement “compre-
hensive and detailed” federal statutes like FIRREA.146 
 For support, the Court cited § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i),147 a new provision 
Congress added as part of FIRREA in 1989148 that the Court charac-
terized as “plac[ing] the FDIC in the shoes of the insolvent S&L, to 
work out its claims under state law, except where some provision in 
the extensive framework of FIRREA provides otherwise.”149 The 
Court found that Congress’s inclusion of new provisions like § 
1821(d)(9),150 a D’Oench-like provision requiring all claims to satisfy § 
1823(e), granted rights to the FDIC as receiver that cannot be aug-
mented or changed by federal common law.151 Congress’s inclusion of 
these provisions excluded the existence of other provisions, including 
federal common law rules.152 The Court reasoned that to create com-
mon law exceptions above and beyond statutory exceptions does not 
supplement the law, but “alter[s]” it.153 
                                                                                                                    
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 83. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 85. 
 145. Id. at 87. 
 146. Id. at 85. 
 147. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (providing that the FDIC “shall . . . by opera-
tion of law, succeed to all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depository in-
stitution”). 
 148. O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 85-86. 
 149. Id. at 87. The Court limited the creation of federal common law only in those lim-
ited situations involving a “significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and 
the use of state law.” Id. (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 
(1966)). 
 150. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A). “[A]ny agreement which does not meet the require-
ments set forth in section 1823(e) of this title shall not form the basis of, or substantially 
comprise, a claim against the receiver or the [FDIC].” Id. 
 151. O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 86-87. 
 152. Id. The Court cited the legal adage “[i]nclusio unius, exclusio alterius,” id. at 87, 
which means “to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 602 (7th ed. 1999). The D.C. Circuit later seized upon this language in 
Murphy v. FDIC as evidence that Congress purposely did not include the common law 
D’Oench provisions in FIRREA, and that FIRREA preempted the D’Oench doctrine. Mur-
phy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1995). See infra Part IV.C. 
 153. O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 87. 
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 In the view of some courts of appeals, the Court’s language in 
O’Melveny—and its 1997 decision in Atherton v. FDIC,154 which ech-
oed O’Melveny—signaled the end of the common law D’Oench doc-
trine in its broad form.155 In those circuits, the common law D’Oench 
doctrine no longer shields the FDIC beyond the protections provided 
in § 1823(e). 
C.   Murphy in the D.C. Circuit 
 O’Melveny provided Bruce Murphy with a stronger argument on 
appeal. Embracing it, Murphy argued that FIRREA preempted the 
common law D’Oench doctrine.156 The FDIC countered, arguing that 
the Supreme Court in O’Melveny never explicitly mentioned the 
D’Oench doctrine and therefore did not alter its validity.157 The D.C. 
Circuit rejected this argument, citing a rule that favors implement-
ing Supreme Court rulings generally rather than to a limited set of 
facts.158 The court also noted that both parties’ briefs in O’Melveny 
advised the Supreme Court that its decision could affect the common 
law D’Oench doctrine.159 Finally, the FDIC argued that although 
O’Melveny may have prohibited the judicial creation of new federal 
common law, it did not prohibit the application of a more than 50-
year-old doctrine.160 But the D.C. Circuit rejected this argument, 
holding that once Congress addresses an issue, the federal courts’ 
“unusual exercise” of creating common law disappears and succumbs 
to the courts’ “commitment to the separation of powers.”161 
 Murphy argued, and the D.C. Circuit agreed, that Congress’s in-
clusion of § 1821(d)(9),162 the D’Oench-like provision cited by the 
O’Melveny Court requiring that all claims satisfy § 1823(e),163 “im-
plies the exclusion of overlapping federal common law defenses not 
specifically mentioned in the statute—of which the D’Oench doctrine 
is one.”164 Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit found that the O’Melveny 
Court’s statement that 
“§ 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) places the FDIC in the shoes of the insolvent S 
& L . . .” [indicated that the Court] appears to have concluded that 
                                                                                                                    
 154. 519 U.S. 213 (1997). In Atherton, the Court applied O’Melveny’s holding that 
“cases in which judicial creation of a special federal rule would be justified . . . are . . . ‘few 
and restricted.’” Id. at 218 (citing O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 87). 
 155. E.g., Murphy, 61 F.3d at 34. 
 156. Id. at 36. 
 157. Id. at 39. 
 158. Id. (citing Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 159. Murphy, 61 F.3d at 39. 
 160. Id. at 40. 
 161. Id. (citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1981)). 
 162. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A) (2000). 
 163. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1994). 
 164. Murphy, 61 F.3d at 39. 
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the Congress in the FIRREA did indeed address the question pre-
viously governed by D’Oench. It follows that the need for a body of 
federal common law under the rubric of D’Oench has now “disap-
peared” . . . .165 
The Court held that FIRREA preempted D’Oench and remanded to 
the district court.166 
 The D.C. Circuit also examined whether § 1823(e) barred Mur-
phy’s claims.167 Citing its 1994 holding in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & 
Co. v. FDIC,168 the court characterized the statute as barring “anyone 
from asserting against the FDIC any agreement not properly re-
corded in the records of the bank that would diminish the value of an 
asset held by the FDIC.”169 However, the court limited § 1823(e) to 
cases involving specific assets arising from “conventional loan trans-
actions.”170 Murphy embraced this language, arguing that unlike the 
plaintiff in D’Oench, he was not a borrower attempting to shirk re-
payment of a conventional loan.171 Rather, Murphy argued he was 
simply an investor—an investor in an investment gone sour because 
of Southeast Bank’s ineptitude.172 The court, influenced by the 
FDIC’s inability to identify any specific asset related to a conven-
tional loan transaction, agreed with Murphy’s argument and held 
that the statute’s asset requirement was not met.173 The court sup-
ported its decision by noting that agreements like the one between 
Murphy and Southeast did not involve an extension of credit and 
therefore did not require approval by Southeast’s board.174 Thus, it 
was not the type of agreement contemplated by § 1823(e)(1)(C).175 
 As the first case to prohibit the FDIC’s use of the broad protec-
tions provided by the common law D’Oench doctrine, the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s ruling in Murphy v. FDIC did not go unnoticed.176 In effect, the 
                                                                                                                    
 165. Id. at 40. (citation omitted). 
 166. Id. at 40-41. 
 167. Id. at 36. 
 168. 32 F.3d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 169. Murphy, 61 F.3d at 36 (citing du Pont, 32 F.3d at 596). 
 170. Id. at 37 (citing du Pont, 32 F.3d at 597) (emphasis added). 
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 173. Id. The court found unconvincing an argument implicit from a footnote in the 
FDIC’s brief that the loans made by Southeast Bank to Orchid were specific assets that 
may be diminished by Murphy’s claim. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See, e.g., D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 16 (arguing that the D.C. Circuit’s rul-
ing was correct); Michael B. Kent, Jr., The Court Giveth, and Congress Taketh Away: 
Statutory Preemption and the Federal Common Law D’Oench Doctrine, 116 BANKING L.J. 
214, 246 (1999) (same). Cf. Bock, supra note 34, at 978-80 (arguing that the D.C. Circuit’s 
ruling was wrong). 
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ruling narrowed the common law D’Oench doctrine to its original 
scope, rendering it useless in the D.C. Circuit.177 
D.   Murphy in the Eleventh Circuit 
 The D.C. Circuit effectively wrested away a doctrine that had be-
come one of the FDIC’s most important weapons against borrowers’ 
defenses, as well as one of its most protective shields against borrow-
ers’ affirmative claims. However, the FDIC refused to stand by and 
watch courts eviscerate the 50-year-old doctrine. 
 On remand to the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, the FDIC again moved for summary judgment.178 More 
importantly, however, the FDIC asked that the case be transferred to 
the Southern District of Florida,179 which, as part of the Eleventh 
Circuit, provided the FDIC with a much friendlier environment. Pre-
viously, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had staunchly de-
fended the D’Oench doctrine, holding that the D’Oench doctrine “ap-
plies in virtually all cases where a federal depository institution 
regulatory agency is confronted with an agreement not documented 
in the institution’s records.”180 The United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia concluded that Florida provided a “more 
convenient location” for the case because Murphy, the majority of 
witnesses, the development, and the now-defunct Southeast Bank 
were located there.181 This more favorable location paid off quickly for 
the FDIC.182 The district court substituted Jeffrey H. Beck183 as suc-
cessor agent for the FDIC and granted the FDIC’s motion to dismiss, 
holding that the federal common law D’Oench doctrine barred Mur-
phy’s claim.184 
                                                                                                                    
 177. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 11. 
 178. Murphy v. FDIC, 208 F.3d 959, 962 (11th Cir. 2000).  
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v. Two Rivers Assocs., Inc., 880 F.2d 1267, 1274, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that the 
D’Oench doctrine applies in FDIC’s receiver capacity). 
 After the D.C. Circuit’s Murphy decision in 1995 but before the Eleventh Circuit’s deci-
sion in 2000, the Eleventh Circuit continued to uphold the common law D’Oench doctrine. 
E.g., Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(en banc), vacated and remanded by Hess v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), reinstated by Mo-
torcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 120 F.3d 1140 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc), 
cert. denied, Hess v. FDIC, 523 U.S. 1093 (1998). 
 181. Murphy, 208 F.3d at 962. 
 182. Murphy tried to transfer the case back to the D.C. Circuit, but was denied. In re 
Murphy, No. 98-5475, 1998 WL 929816 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 9, 1998). 
 183. Beck had been Southeast’s Chapter 7 trustee and was appointed successor agent 
after the FDIC completed its receivership duties. Brief For Respondent at 2 n.1, Murphy v. 
Beck, 121 S. Ct. 30 (2000) (No. 00-46), cert. dismissed, 121 S. Ct. 849 (2001). 
 184. Murphy, 208 F.3d at 969. The district court offered two alternative grounds for its 
decision. Id. at 962. First, Murphy could not claim that Southeast Bank owed him a duty 
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 Murphy appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which reviewed the 
district court’s summary judgment de novo.185 Murphy made four dif-
ferent arguments as to why the D’Oench doctrine should not apply to 
the case.186 First, in an attempt to regain the jurisdictional advan-
tages of the D.C. Circuit, Murphy argued that the choice of law doc-
trine required the Eleventh Circuit to apply the D.C. Circuit’s laws, 
not its own.187 Second, Murphy argued that the ruling by the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit should constitute the “law of the case.”188 
Third, he argued that the D’Oench doctrine should not apply when a 
monetary surplus has been amassed during FDIC receivership.189 
 Finally, Murphy argued that the Supreme Court’s recent rulings 
in O’Melveny and Atherton invalidated the D’Oench doctrine.190 From 
the outset of its opinion, however, the Eleventh Circuit positioned it-
self as a defender of the D’Oench doctrine. The court outlined the doc-
trine’s scope: 
In a suit over the enforcement of an agreement originally executed 
between an insured depository institution and a private party, a 
private party may not enforce against a federal deposit insurer any 
obligation not specifically memorialized in a written document 
such that the agency would be aware of the obligation when con-
ducting an examination of the institution’s records.191 
                                                                                                                    
as joint venturer with Orchid, because a written agreement made by Orchid and Southeast 
Bank explicitly disclaimed the existence of any joint venture between the two parties. Id. 
Also, even if Murphy was not a party to the written agreement between Orchid and South-
east Bank, he had failed to prove the existence of any joint venture. Id. 
 185. Id. at 962. 
 186. Id. at 963. 
 187. Id. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, choosing to follow the D.C., Sec-
ond, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, which had held that in cases involving federal issues, 
transferee courts must follow their own interpretations of law. Id. at 964-66. 
 188. Id. at 963. The law-of-the-case doctrine provides: “[W]hen a court decides upon a 
rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages 
in the same case.” Id. at 966 (citing Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)). How-
ever, courts have discretion to apply the law of the case doctrine, and the Eleventh Circuit 
chose not to. Id. (citing Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. at 618). 
 189. Id. at 963. Southeast’s receivership generated a $150 million surplus, which the 
FDIC distributed to Southeast’s shareholders. Id. at 966-67. Murphy argued that those 
shareholders should not benefit from his $500,000 loss. Id. at 967. The court rejected the 
argument and stated that D’Oench’s rationale—to allow the FDIC to make quick and reli-
able evaluations of bank records—is not affected whether or not the failed bank generates 
a surplus. Id. 
 190. Id. at 963. 
 191. Id. (citing Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317, 1326 
(11th Cir. 1996) (en banc) [Motorcity I], vacated and remanded by Hess v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 
1087 (1997), reinstated by Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 120 F.3d 1140 
(11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) [Motorcity II]; OPS Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 306, 
308 (11th Cir. 1993); Baumann v. Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1510 
(11th Cir. 1991); FSLIC v. Two Rivers Assocs., Inc., 880 F.2d 1267, 1274, 1276-77 (11th 
Cir. 1989)). 
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 Next, the court addressed the D.C. Circuit’s finding that Congress 
preempted the common law D’Oench doctrine.192 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit cited previous cases in which it held that the doctrine applies “in 
virtually all cases” involving an undocumented agreement.193 After 
highlighting its fundamental disagreement with the D.C. Circuit, the 
court addressed Murphy’s argument that the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in O’Melveny, and also the Court’s recent Atherton decision, 
worked to essentially kill the D’Oench doctrine.194 Citing previous 
holdings, the Eleventh Circuit held that O’Melveny and Atherton in-
volved the question of whether the judiciary can create new federal 
common law doctrines to supplement particular statutes.195 The Su-
preme Court did not, the court explained, address the question of 
whether Congress intended FIRREA to replace the D’Oench doc-
trine.196 The court argued that United States v. Texas,197 rather than 
O’Melveny and Atherton, provided the applicable Supreme Court 
holding.198 In United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court stated the 
“longstanding . . . principle that ‘[s]tatutes which invade the common 
law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of 
long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory 
purpose . . . is evident.’”199 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held, Con-
gress did not intend to abrogate the then nearly 50-year-old D’Oench 
doctrine.200 The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Mur-
phy’s claims, injecting one final, unequivocal statement: “[T]he 
D’Oench, Duhme doctrine remains good law in this Circuit, and there 
is no sound reason not to apply the doctrine in this case.”201 
 Shortly after the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, Murphy appealed to 
the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.202 It appeared as 
though the Court finally would resolve the circuit split over the 
D’Oench doctrine’s existence. However, only five days before oral ar-
                                                                                                                    
 192. Murphy, 208 F.3d at 963. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 968-69. 
 195. Id. at 968 (citing Motorcity II, 120 F.3d at 1143, and Motorcity I, 83 F.3d at 1330). 
 196. Id. at 968-69. 
 197. 507 U.S. 529 (1993). 
 198. Murphy, 208 F.3d at 969. 
 199. Id. n.7 (citing United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. at 534 (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. 
Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952))). 
 200. Id. at 969. The court stated:  
We continue to believe that the analysis set forth in our prior en banc opinion re-
flects the most reasonable reading of Congress’s intent—i.e., that Congress did 
not intend FIRREA to displace the D’Oench doctrine, but rather intended to con-
tinue the harmonious, forty-year coexistence of the statute and the D’Oench doc-
trine.  
Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Murphy v. Beck, 121 S. Ct. 30 (2000). 
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guments, Murphy and the FDIC settled their dispute, leaving the 
question unanswered.203  
V.   THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW D’OENCH DOCTRINE 
A.   The Supreme Court 
 As exemplified in Murphy, the circuit courts of appeals remain 
split over whether Congress preempted the common law D’Oench 
doctrine.204 Barring the highly unlikely event that one view over-
comes the other throughout the circuits, the Supreme Court must 
unify the circuits.205 However, the Court probably will not resolve the 
circuit split in the near future. 
 First, due to relative calm in the banking industry and the FDIC’s 
1997 policy statement,206 in which it agreed to resist invoking the 
common law D’Oench doctrine, the number of D’Oench cases litigated 
will probably decrease.207 However, the FDIC policy statement is dis-
cretionary, and whether the FDIC will follow it strictly or loosely is 
still uncertain.208  
 Perhaps most significantly, a D’Oench case will not likely get to 
the Court soon because the FDIC has an incentive to settle those 
cases before they reach the Court, as it did in Murphy. The FDIC’s 
main objective may be to prevent the Court from completely wresting 
away the common law D’Oench doctrine. Presently, a significant pos-
sibility exists that the Court would do this, for a number of reasons: 
the O’Melveny and Atherton holdings, which say that legislation like 
FIRREA preempts federal common law rules, are persuasive and 
sensible;209 the common law D’Oench doctrine, acting as a de facto 
statute of frauds, produces unfair results in some cases;210 and § 
1823(e) may provide the FDIC with adequate protection, while the 
common law D’Oench doctrine overprotects in the relatively calm 
banking climate that currently exists.211 Also, the Court’s 1997 Hess 
decision, which vacated and remanded the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc 
                                                                                                                    
 203. Murphy v. Beck, 121 S. Ct. 849 (2001). 
 204. See also infra Part VI (noting that the D.C., Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits 
have held that Congress preempted the D’Oench doctrine, while the Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits held the doctrine was not preempted). 
 205. See, e.g., Bock, supra note 34, at 984. 
 206. FDIC Policy Statement, supra note 107, at 5986. 
 207. But see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-12, Murphy v. Beck, 208 F.3d 959 
(11th Cir. 2000) (arguing that the D’Oench doctrine continues to arise in litigation, even af-
ter the FDIC’s policy statement). 
 208. Id. at 15; see also Bock, supra note 34, at 986. 
 209. For instance, they persuaded the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits to adopt the 
view that § 1823(e) abrogated the common law D’Oench doctrine. See supra Part IV.B. 
 210. See supra Part III.B, Part I, and note 13. 
 211. See D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 16. 
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decision in Motorcity I212 and upheld the D’Oench doctrine with in-
structions to apply Atherton, provides telling evidence that the Court 
may abolish the common law D’Oench doctrine.213 
 In all likelihood, the FDIC will settle in unfriendly jurisdictions, 
including the D.C., Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, in order to 
avoid court-imposed judgments. The FDIC will also settle in its 
friendly jurisdictions, the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits, to avoid con-
tinued appeals to the Supreme Court. The Court will not likely see a 
D’Oench case again until the FDIC becomes confident that, due to 
another banking crisis or a change of faces on the Court, the Court 
will protect the FDIC by upholding the common law doctrine. For 
now, however, the key to the doctrine’s survival involves keeping its 
footing within as many circuits as possible. 
B.   Cost vs. Fairness 
 Undeniably, the common law D’Oench doctrine produces unfair 
results in cases where the failed bank acted fraudulently or made 
misrepresentations.214 For example, borrowers defrauded by a bank 
officer’s oral misrepresentations cannot raise traditional contract de-
fenses that overcome D’Oench.215 Commentators argue that D’Oench, 
as an equitable doctrine,216 should not be used in those cases:217 “In 
an era when, unfortunately, bank officers of failed banks often have 
acted to the detriment of their borrowers (sometimes criminally so), 
the borrowers, like the FDIC, deserve some protection.”218 The com-
mon law D’Oench doctrine’s protection may fail to discourage trou-
bled banks from engaging in fraud or misrepresentation, although it 
does not encourage those practices. 
 Commentators add that § 1823(e), unaided by the common law 
D’Oench doctrine, provides the FDIC with adequate protection.219 
Therefore, the added protection provided by the common law doctrine 
is unnecessary. 
                                                                                                                    
 212. Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(en banc), vacated and remanded by Hess v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), reinstated by Mo-
torcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 120 F.3d 1140 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
 213. Hess v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), reinstated by Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. 
v. Southeast Bank, 120 F.3d 1140 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
 214. Galves, supra note 3, at 1328 (arguing that the D’Oench doctrine creates an “un-
fair windfall” to the FDIC). 
 215. J. Michael Echevarria, A Precedent Embalms a Principle: The Expansion of the 
D’Oench, Duhme Doctrine, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 745, 803 (1994). 
 216. Galves, supra note 3, at 1347-48; Gleit, supra note 21, at 227. 
 217. See, e.g., Galves, supra note 3, at Part III (calling for reform of the D’Oench doc-
trine that would continue to protect the FDIC, except in certain cases where D’Oench 
causes injustices to borrowers). 
 218. Hymanson, supra note 8, at 257. 
 219. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 16. 
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 Although the common law D’Oench doctrine gives the FDIC pro-
tections that occasionally produce unfair results, the six circuits220 
that have not directly decided D’Oench’s fate should uphold the doc-
trine because it provides monetary and efficiency benefits that out-
weigh the costs created by unfair outcomes. The D’Oench doctrine 
has spared the FDIC from billions of dollars in claims made by bor-
rowers alleging side agreements with failed banks.221 First, the com-
mon law doctrine provides the FDIC’s insurance fund broader protec-
tion than § 1823(e) does. Although this added protection becomes less 
significant in a calm banking climate, the FDIC will need this added 
protection in future banking crises. 
 Second, the common law D’Oench doctrine, as a de facto statute of 
frauds, provides the FDIC with crucial efficiency benefits. When a fi-
nancial institution fails, the FDIC must quickly and accurately de-
termine the institution’s financial status.222 This important decision 
includes whether to liquidate the institution’s assets or sell them 
through purchase and assumption agreements.223 The accuracy of 
these decisions affects the solvency of the insurance fund and the 
public’s confidence in the FDIC: if the FDIC must liquidate the insti-
tution, public confidence in the banking industry will weaken.224 
 As a result, the FDIC prefers purchase and assumption agree-
ments.225 Purchase and assumption agreements allow the FDIC to 
sell the failed bank’s healthy assets to other banks, which then as-
sume payments owed to the failed bank’s depositors.226 The FDIC, as 
receiver, then sells the failed bank’s bad assets to the corporate arm 
of the FDIC.227 With the money made on this sale, the FDIC/receiver 
partially reimburses the banks that assumed the failed bank’s liabili-
ties.228 
 Time is a major factor in the FDIC’s decision to liquidate or enter 
into purchase and assumption agreements because the execution of 
purchase and assumption agreements must occur almost immedi-
ately after an institution fails.229 The common law D’Oench doctrine 
allows the FDIC to quickly evaluate a failed bank’s books and enter 
                                                                                                                    
 220. The First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits. 
 221. For example, the common law D’Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) saved the FDIC 
more than $1 billion from 1993 to 1994. Oversight Hearings, supra note 45, at 161. 
 222. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1987). 
 223. Shumadine, supra note 5, at 144 (citing Timberland Design, Inc. v. First Serv. 
Bank for Sav., 932 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1991) (citations omitted)). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 4. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865-66 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that a pur-
chase and assumption agreement must be “consummated with great speed”). 
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into purchase and assumption agreements. Without the doctrine, the 
FDIC’s evaluation may take longer as it investigates claims against 
the failed bank by borrowers and creditors who aver nonwritten 
agreements. 
 The monetary and efficiency benefits provided by the common law 
D’Oench doctrine overcome the unfairness argument. The FDIC must 
deal with failed banks under considerable time constraints, without 
adequate time to recognize valid nonwritten agreements. The FDIC’s 
priorities include the solvency of the insurance fund, bank depositors, 
and public confidence in the banking system—not borrowers who en-
ter into nonwritten agreements with financial institutions. The 
common law D’Oench doctrine has never produced an unfair outcome 
in a case where a borrower brought a written agreement to court. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The current circuit split seems to stem from each court’s own 
opinion as to whether cost or fairness should be the fundamental 
consideration when deciding whether Congress abrogated the com-
mon law D’Oench doctrine. The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits view 
D’Oench’s cost savings and efficiency gains as being more important 
than preventing the inequities the doctrine sometimes causes. This is 
the correct view because the banking industry relies on a solvent and 
strong FDIC to insure it. On the other hand, the D.C., Third, Eighth, 
and Ninth Circuits assign paramount importance to equity. Abrogat-
ing the common law D’Oench doctrine provides one way for those 
courts to achieve that equity. 
 The split will not work itself out. The FDIC, banks, and their bor-
rowers must wait for the Supreme Court to resolve the issue. How-
ever, as was the case in Murphy, the FDIC has an incentive to settle: 
it ensures the continued viability of the D’Oench doctrine in at least 
some jurisdictions. Until the Court resolves the split, the common 
law D’Oench doctrine, already long in the tooth, remains viable—
even though it has lost some bite. 
